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Abstract—Hybrid wireless mesh network (WMN) consists of two 
types of nodes: Mesh Routers which are relatively static and 
energy-rich devices, and Mesh Clients which are relatively 
dynamic and power constrained devices. In this paper we present 
a new model for WMN end-to-end security which divide 
authentication process into two phases: Mesh Access Point phase 
which based on asymmetric cryptography and Mesh Client phase 
which based on a server-side certificate such as EAP-TTLS 
and PEAP.  
Keywords-component; Hybrid mesh; network security; end-to-
end authentication; server mobile; mobile router 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Wireless networks have grown rapidly for the past years 
due to recent developments, easy installation and low setup 
cost as compared to wired networks [1]. Wireless Mesh 
Network (WMN) is a promising new technology which is 
adopted as the wireless internetworking solution for the near 
future due to their self-healing, self-configuring and self-
optimizing capabilities [16]. The most commercial form of 
WMN is called hybrid mesh networks [2], shown in Figure 1. 
Hybrid mesh networks consist of two types of wireless nodes: 
Mesh_Routers/Access_Point (MAP) and Mesh_Clients 
(MC). Mesh Routers are relatively static and energy-rich 
devices that have multiple wireless network interfaces. On the 
other hand Mesh Clients are relatively mobile and power 
constrained devices such as notebook, Smartphone, and smart 
pad [17]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Hybrid wireless mesh network. 
II. ROUTING IN WMN 
The routing protocols used for WMNs can be categorized 
into two types: Reactive and Proactive [13][14][18]. In 
reactive routing protocols, the routes are established only when 
required, generally via flooding of Route Request packets in 
the network. While, in proactive routing protocols the routes 
are established before actual usage, through periodical 
exchanges of connectivity information. Both protocols have 
their individual advantages. Reactive protocols focus on 
minimizing control packet overhead such as Ad hoc On 
Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [3], Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) [4],Temporally-Ordered Routing Algorithm 
(TORA) [5] etc. while the proactive protocols attempt to 
minimize the route establishment delays such as OLSR [4], 
DSDV [5]. 
However, since these routing protocols have been designed 
for relatively homogenous MANETs, they will not provide 
optimum security for hybrid WMNs. An important security 
goal of a wireless mesh network is to protect the end-to-end 
communication between the device and its home network, in 
particular to protect the application content from being 
eavesdropped or modified during its transmission. 
III. RELATED WORK 
A. KAMAN 
Kerberos Assisted Authentication in Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks [6] uses multiple Kerberos servers for distributed 
authentication and load distribution. In Kaman only the users 
know the secret key or passwords and the servers know a 
cryptographic hash of these passwords. All Kaman servers 
share a secret key with each other server. In Kaman all servers 
periodically, or on-demand, replicate their databases with each 
other. Kaman uses an election based server selection 
mechanism. 
B. TAODV 
Ticket Based Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector [7] is a 
ticket-based security protocol foe WMNs that is based upon the 
AODV protocol, which is a cross layer protocol which works 
at network layer but also provides security for data exchange  
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and avoids transfer of ARP messages for finding MAC 
addresses of source and destination. 
C. Secure Extension to the OLSR protocol  
Use The Secure Extension to the OLSR protocol [8] has 
only provides integrity and not confidentiality by signing each 
OLSR control packet with digital signature for authenticating 
the message. The digital signature is based on symmetric keys 
[19]. All OLSR control traffic is signed for every hop. This 
doesn’t provide end-to-end signatures. 
IV. OUR PROPOSED MODEL 
Our proposed model aims to achieve an end-to-end 
authentication in WMN. In order to achieve such goal we have 
divided the authentication way into two phases: the MAP 
phase in which a new MAP conducts the network, and the MC 
phase is when a new MC conducts the network. 
At the MAP phase, we consider that MAP is energy rich 
devices so we can use asymmetric cryptographic [19] in 
contrary to MC devices in the second part of the authentication, 
server-side certificate such as EAP-TTLS and PEAP. 
A. MAP Phase  
During the setup phase when a Router/MAP connects to the 
WMN it has to follow the following steps: (1) MAP sends its 
details including the type (1 for MAP / 0 for MC) and MAC 
address to an Authentication Server (AS). (2) AS will send key 
generation mechanism back to the MAP after checking MAC 
address in a stored list. (3) MAP will generate its public and 
secret keys, and then sends its public key (PKMAP) to the AS. 
Then AS also generates a secret key (KMAP)for new MAP and 
itself on the basis of public key of MAP and its secret key by 
using Fixed Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. (4) AS 
generates a ticket for new MAP with required info (MAP ID, 
IP, issue time, expiration time etc.) ticketMAP and sign it with 
its private key. Then, after signing, AS will encrypt that ticket 
with the shared secret key and then forward this encrypted 
ticket to new MAP. After receiving encrypted ticket, new MAP 
will first generate a shared secret key on the basis of AS’s 
public key and its secret key (as AS generated) and then will 
decrypt the ticket. For future communication (route discovery 
request/reply) MAP will use this ticket. 
 
 
 
 
 
| 
 
Figure 2.  MAP phase 
B. MC Phase 
When a new MC connects to the WMN the AS ask for 
credentials such as user name or ID number and password (via 
PAP, CHAP, or MD5 challenges) [9]. In this phase server-side 
certificate such as EAP-TTLS and PEAP can be used. After 
successful authentication, the mobile node will receive a secret 
key that shares with the authentication server (AS). 
C. MAP –to- MAP Authentication 
As we mentioned before MAP depends on proactive 
protocols such as OLSR in order to build routing table through 
periodical exchanges of connectivity information, when an 
MAP discover a new neighboring MAP,  a secure route must 
be established. In order to have a secure route between MAPs, 
the first MAP sends it identifier and the identifier of destination 
second MAP to the AS, which in turn looks up both MAPs in 
its database in order to verify the validity of both clients. 
MAP1        AS:  {IDMAP1, IDMAP2} KMAP1||ticketMAP1-AS ||Nonce  
AS sends ticketMAP2 {KMAP1-AS, KMAP12, IDMAP1, T} in 
which KMAP12 is the secret shared key between two MAPs and 
T is the lifetime of that key, this ticket will be sent to MAP1 
along with the Authenticator which provides MAP1 with the 
shared key and proof that this is the right shared key to use 
with MAP2 at this time. 
AS         MAP1:   ticketMAP2 || IDMAP1 || {KMAP12, lifetime, Nonce, 
IDMAP2}KMAP1 
MAP1 decrypts Authenticator in order to validate its 
information and then creates a new message with a fresh 
timestamp, this message contains both identifiers in addition 
to ticketMAP2 and encrypted values that express MAP2 
identifier with the fresh timestamp. And then send this message 
to MAP2. 
MAP1        MAP2:   ticketMAP2 || IDMAP1, IDMAP2 ||timestamp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  MC phase 
(1) MAP AS:      Type|| MAC|| Nonce 
(2) AS     MAP:  key generation mechanism|| Nonce 
(3) MAP  AS:      PKMAP || Nonce 
(4) AS     MAP:   {ticketMAP-AS}KMAP || Nonce 
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After receiving this message MAP2 decrypts ticketMAP2 
with KMAP2 to obtain KMAP12 which in turn used to get the 
encrypted values, then MAP2 validates timestamp and local 
time comparing the life time sent from MAP1. In case the 
verification succeeded, MAP2 send a new encrypted message 
with KMAP12, this message contains the timestamp sent before 
by MAP1 and a new key instead of KMAP12 called subkey used 
as a shared key between two clients in their communications. 
When the message received MAP1 decrypts it and verifies 
timestamp. If the verification succeeded, MAP1 knows that 
MAP2 received the previous message 
MAP2 MAP1: {timestamp, subkey}KMAP12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  MAP-to-MAP authentication. 
D. Client–to-Client Authentication 
For Client–to-Client Authentication, our proposed model 
uses EAP authentication with a modified version of a scheme 
known as a four-pass Kerberos protocol [10][15]. 
When a new MC connects to the WMN it approves itself to 
the Authentication Server (AS) in order to get a secret key 
shared with the AS in addition to a unique identifier ID. 
Whenever an MC wants to establish a secure connection 
with another MC it approaches the AS and follows the protocol 
as following steps: 
In the first Client MC1, sends its identifier and the identifier 
of destination client MC2 to the AS, which in turn looks up 
both MCs in its database in order to verify the validity of both 
clients. 
MC1       AS:   IDMC1 || IDMC2 || Nonce 
AS sends ticketMC2 which contains KMC12 and the 
lifetime of that key, this ticket will be sent to MC1 along with 
the Authenticator which provides MC1 with the shared key and 
proof that this is the right shared key to use with MC2 at this 
time. 
AS        MC1:   ticketMC2 || IDMC1 || {KMC12, lifetime, Nonce, 
IDMC2}KMC1 
MC1 decrypts Authenticator in order to validate its 
information and then creates a new message with a fresh 
timestamp, this message contains both identifiers in addition 
to ticketMC2 and encrypted values that express MC2 identifier 
with the fresh timestamp. And then send this message to MC2. 
MC1 MC2:   ticketMC2 || Authenticator 
After receiving this message MC2 decrypts ticketMC2 with 
KMC2 to obtain KMC12 which in turn used to get the encrypted 
values, then MC2 validates timestamp and local time 
comparing the life time sent from MC1. 
In case the verification succeeded, MC2 send a new 
encrypted message with KMC12, this message contains the 
timestamp sent before by MC1 and a new key instead of 
KMC12 called subkey used as a shared key between two clients 
in their communications. When the message received MC1 
decrypts it and verifies timestamp. If the verification 
succeeded, MC1 knows that MC2 received the previous 
message in proper form and decrypt the shared key correctly. 
MC2   MC1: {timestamp, subkey}KMC12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Client-to-Client authentication. 
We have to notice that all routes between MAP’s are all 
secured through MAP-to-MAP authentication steps, so that 
when MC1 send a message to MC2 this message will be 
encrypted by the shared secret key subkey between every 
single MAP pair, this will provide both node–to–node and end-
to-end security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  end-to-end security. 
E. Server Election 
Due to wireless network nature, and because our proposed 
model depending on server side authentication; we used an 
election based mechansim in order to overcom the 
nonavilability of one or more server. In order to intiate 
a) MAP1 AS:  {IDMAP1 , IDMAP2 } KMAP1||ticketMAP1-AS 
||Nonce 
b) AS MAP1:   ticketMAP2 || IDMAP1 || {KMAP12, lifetime, 
Nonce, IDMAP2}KMAP1 
c) MAP1 MAP2:   ticketMAP2 || IDMAP1, IDMAP2 ||timestamp 
d) MAP2 MAP1: {timestamp, subkey}KMAP12 
 
a) MC1 AS:   IDMC1 || IDMC2 || Nonce 
b) AS  MC1:   ticketMC2 || IDMC1 || {KMC12, lifetime, Nonce, 
IDMC2}KMC1 
c) MC1 MC2:   ticketMC2 || Authenticator 
d) MC2 MC1: {timestamp, subkey}KMC12 
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election process [6] has define the following three conditions 
(1) when the number of servers increases or decreases. (2) 
when the server lifetime expiers (3)when a server fails the 
optional availability check mechanism. 
Servers periodically use secure BEACON and ECHO packets 
to discover the availability of other servers [6].in the case the 
server is in non-availabilty situation, the election procedure 
intiates. Server elecation process based on factors such as 
connectivity, processing ability, RAM capacity, and network 
topology such as wireless transmission range, geographical 
position, or the lifetime expiration of a server. these factors 
reflect Server Ability Degree (SAD) [11] which takes into 
account static factors such as RAM capacity, and dynamic 
factors such as network topology. 
We are defined the following factors in order to calcutate 
SAD, (1) CPU ability.(2)RAM capacity. (3)hop count; AS is 
prefearable to has central position to all APs in the network, 
this position is given by the mean distance between this server 
and all APs in the network. (4)Server ticket’s lifetime. The 
weights assigned to each of these criteria are w1=3 for CPU 
ability criterian, w2=1 for RAM capacity criterian, w3=2 for 
hop count criterian, and w4=4 for ticket’s lifetime criterian. 
The equation for calculating SAD is: 
SAD (ASj) = w1*c1 + w2*c2 + w3*c3+…+wncn (1) 
After calculating SAD for every server, the highset value 
server will be upgraded to be the Authentication server. 
F. Database Riplecation 
Regular database replication maintains authentication 
mechanism and server election procedure. Periodically 
replications protect server from being captured or 
compromised. Also it does maintain database updated with all 
added, modified, and revoked accounts since last replicate. 
Since WMN contains MCs that work as routers and by noticing 
that these devices are energy-poor devices, we recommend 
using a distributed replication scheme called Distributed 
Adaptive Service Replication (DAR) [12]. DAR aims to 
improve service availability with reasonable energy 
consumption across the network. In order to dynamically place 
service replicas in appropriate nodes, DAR divides the whole 
network into disjoint zones with diameters at most 2 hops, 
selects a node with minimum moving speed in each zone as a 
zone head, and constructs a virtual backbone network 
connecting all zone heads. Each replication has a sequence 
replication number in order to maintain global consistency of 
the database as described in KAMAN Replication 
Repository[6] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  The Fuzzification functions f(x)used in RAWSM 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we present a new model for securing end-to-end 
wireless mesh network with ticked based-authentication. This 
model divides the authentication process into two phases: MAP 
Server1 Server2:   {Seq# || time || Database} KAS12 
Seq#: Replication Sequence Number.  
time: the time of executing this replica. 
KAS12 : shared secrete key between two Database. 
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phase and MC phase. In the first phase Our proposed model 
authenticate MAP using asymmetric cryptography [19] 
depending on MAP’s MAC address, this phase ensure securing 
all network path by establishing ticket based route between 
every single MAP pair. While in the second phase the 
authentication process done by proving the new MC itself to 
the AS using credentials, these credentials will be a username 
or ID and a password. This is required since the MC doesn’t 
have any certificate yet. Then AS use a server-side certificate 
such as EAP-TTLS and PEAP in order to authenticate the new 
MC. This is a secure method that saves MC battery since it is 
constrained power devices. Our proposed model uses a 
modified version of a scheme known as a four-pass Kerberos 
protocol in MAP-to-MAP authentication and MC-to-MC 
authentication. By doing this we ensure providing secure node-
to-node routes for all routes in the network in addition to the 
end-to-end security message that cannot be decrypted without 
the secret key at the receiver MC. With reasonable consuming 
to the battery at MC side. 
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